Introduction
This case represents the latest stage in a legal saga that spans a decade. Some background is therefore necessary to understand the legal argumentation in the instant case.
Artegodan is the holder of a marketing authorization for Tenuate Retard, a medicinal product, which contains amfepramone, an amphetamine-like anorectic substance. There was however a re-evaluation of amfepramone at the request of a Member State, and this led the Commission to adopt the contested decision on the basis of Article 15a of Directive 75/3 19. 2 This Directive established a system of mutual recognition, whereby an authorization granted in one Member State had to be recognized in other Member States. There were however not surprisingly qualifications to this regime, and it was open to a Member State pursuant to Article 15a to press for the withdrawal of the authorization on the ground of public health concerns. The schema was for the Member State to refer the matter to the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, CPMP, although it was open to the Member State in cases of urgency to suspend authorization of the product in its territory pending this final decision. The CPMP issued a reasoned opin- ion which would be forwarded by the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products to the Member States, the Commission and the person responsible for placing the medicinal product on the market, with a report describing the assessment of the medicinal product and stating the reasons for its conclusions.' It was then for the Commission, within 30 days of receipt of the CPMP's opinion, to prepare a draft decision. Where exceptionally the draft decision was not in accordance with the opinion of the EMA it was incumbent on the Commission to provide a detailed explanation of the reasons for the differences.
The Commission decision ordered the Member States to withdraw the national marketing authorizations for amfepramone, in reliance on scientific conclusions attached to the CPMP's final opinion in August 1999. This was challenged by Artegodan, which argued, inter alia, that the Commission lacked competence and that the decision infringed Directive 65/65.s The GC annulled the contested decision in 2002 on the ground that the Commission lacked competence, and held moreover that even if the Commission had competence the decision infringed Article 11 of Directive 65/65.6 The GC's decision was upheld on appeal. The ECJ held that the Commission lacked competence to adopt the contested decision, but did not rule on the other arguments concerning Directive 65/65.'
Artegodan then sought damages for the losses it had suffered in the three year period that the product had been withdrawn from the market while the legal proceedings contesting the legality of the withdrawal were being heard. The Commission rejected the claim in 2004, arguing that the conditions for non-contractual liability were not met, because there was no suf ficiently serious breach of EU law. Artegodan then began proceedings in 2005 seeking damages, but the GC dismissed the action under what is now Article 340 TFEU, on the ground that the applicant had not established a sufficiently serious breach of EU law. of Directive 65/65 by the GC in 2002 was said to be irrelevant. The GC nonetheless concluded that the conditions for non-contractual liability were not met.
It held that the rules contained in Directive 75/319 delimiting the areas of competence of the Commission and the Member States were not intended to confer rights on individuals, but were rather intended to organize the division of powers between the national authorities and the Commission, as regards the procedure for the mutual recognition of national marketing authorizations.
It held moreover that the infringement of Article 11 of Directive 65/65 did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach for the purposes of damages liability.
The GC decided that Article 11 did not confer any meaningful discretion on the Commission in the application of the substantive criteria for suspension or withdrawal of a marketing authorization.' It nonetheless concluded that infringement of Article 11 did not suffice to show a sufficiently serious breach for the EU to incur liability. This was because the EU courts had to take into account the legal and factual complexity of the situation to be regulated, notwithstanding the fact that Article 11 accorded priority to the protection of public health. Thus while the GC was clear that the error regarding Article 11 warranted annulment of the withdrawal of the authorization, it was necessary in adjudicating damages liability 'to take into account the particular difficulties to which the interpretation and application of that article give rise in this case'. 10 The GC continued in the following vein.'' Having regard to the lack of precision of Article 11 of Directive 65/65, the difficulties related to the systematic interpretation of the conditions for withdrawal or suspension of a marketing authorization laid down by that article in the light of the whole Community system for the prior authorization of medicinal products (Artegodan v Commission paragraphs 187 to 195) could reasonably explain, in the absence of any similar precedent, the error of law committed by the Commission in accepting the legal relevance of the new scientific criterion applied by the CPMP, even though it was not supported by any new scientific data or information.
The GC reinforced this conclusion by adverting to the nature of the decision-making in this area. The practical reality was that the CPMP made the assessment, this was accepted by the EMA and the Commission then made the formal decision in the light of this recommendation. If the Commission were to disagree with the recommendation it had to provide detailed reasons. The GC felt that it would in any event have been very difficult for the Commission to acquaint itself with the scientific reasoning that informed the CPMP's conclusions. This reinforced the legal and factual complexity in the instant case and meant that the Commission's error did not amount to a sufficiently serious breach for the purpose of damages liability. Artegodan not surprisingly contested the finding of the GC that the rules on the division of competence between the Commission and the Member States resulting from Directive 75/319 were not of such a kind as to cause the EU to incur non-contractual liability on the ground that they were not intended to confer rights on individuals. It contended that such rules did confer rights on individuals in circumstances where exercise of the relevant power could lead, as in this case, to restrictive measures being taken against undertakings. The CJEU upheld Artegodan's argument, although its judgment is nonetheless unclear in certain respects. The Court held that failure to observe the division of powers between the EU institutions, where the aim is to ensure that the balance between the institutions provided in the Treaties is maintained, and not to protect individuals, does not suffice per se to render the EU liable towards the traders concerned.
However the position was different if a measure of the EU was adopted that not only disregarded the division of powers between the institutions 'but also, in its substantive provisions, disregarded a superior rule of law protecting individuals'."
The CJEU concluded that the GC made an error of law by holding that infringement by the Commission of the rules governing the division of competences between the Commission and the Member States resulting from Directive 75/319 was not of such a kind as to cause the EU to incur non-contractual liability on the ground that those rules are not intended to confer rights on individuals, because the GC had not taken into account the point of principle in the previous paragraph, 'according to which such an infringement, when it is accompanied by an infringement of a substantive provision which has such an intention, is capable of giving rise to that liability'.
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The CJEU does not, however, identify the superior of law for the protection of the individual that was disregarded in the instant case. This part of the judgment is therefore somewhat Delphic. There has to be something in addition to the infringement of the rules relating to the division of power between the institutions that can qualify as the superior rule of law. It may be that the CJEU regarded the GC as having committed an error of law simply because it did not investigate this possibility, without the CJEU itself reaching any conclusion as to what such a superior rule of law might be. The alternative reading of the judgment is that the superior rule of law might have been Article 11 of Directive 65/65, although the difficulty with this reading is that the CJEU held ultimately that the Article had not been infringed. ly its refusal to find that the breach of this Article constituted a sufficiently serious breach of EU law. It argued, inter alia, that the complexity of a legal or factual situation should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is an absence of any sufficiently serious breach.
Infringement of
The CJEU's consideration of this aspect of the appeal was rendered more complex by the fact that discussion of damages liability was interwoven with the issue of whether the ECJ in 2003" had pronounced on Article 11 of Directive 65/65. The CJEU reiterated the importance of res judicata in EU law, regarding it as important to ensure stability of the law, and the sound administration of justice: 'judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted, or after expiry of the time-limits provided to exercise those rights, can no longer be called into question'.
1 6 However res judicata extended 'only to the matters of fact and law actually or necessarily settled by the judicial decision in question'." The legal reality was that the
ECJ's 2003
ruling was premised on the Commission's lack of competence, and the ECJ did not, as noted earlier, rule on the Article 11 issue. The CJEU therefore concluded that the Article 11 issue had not yet been addressed and that the 2003 ruling was only res judicata in relation to the competence issue." Insofar as the GC in the case under appeal had found that the Article 11 issue had been deter mined and was thus res judicata, it had made an er ror of law."
The hopes of success that Artegodan might have harboured at this point were however to prove short lived, because the CJEU drew on the principle that if the GC erred in law the decision could nonetheless be upheld if the operative part of the decision could be shown to be well founded on other legal grounds.
This was held to be so here. Article 11 of Directive 65/65 was intended to confer rights on undertakings which held a marketing authorization. It was nonetheless still necessary for the applicant to show a sufficiently serious breach of the substantive criteria for the withdrawal of a marketing authoriza- In the present case, the Commission's decision to use the criterion of long-term efficacy in order to assess the therapeutic efficacy of amfepramone in the treatment of obesity and to withdraw the mar keting authorization concerning the medicinal products containing that substance is based on the existence of a consensus within the medical community regarding a new assessment criterion of that therapeutic efficacy, according to which an ef fective therapy in the treatment of obesity must be for the long-term, on the questioning of the ther apeutic efficacy of that substance, and also on the finding, in the light of that new assessment criterion, of a negative benefit/risk assessment of that substance. It followed said the CJEU that the Commission did not fail to comply with the substantive criteria for the withdrawal of a marketing authorization of a medicinal product laid down in Article 11 of Directive 65/65."1 There had been no breach of Article 11 and hence there was no sufficiently serious breach for the purposes of damages liability." It followed also that the errors of law committed by the GC were not such as to invalidate the contested judgment, given that the conclusion could be justified on the grounds specified above.
Ill. Conclusion
Artegodan is a difficult case, primarily because of the admixture of legal issues that came before the CJEU, more especially the conjunction of discourse concerning the application of the sufficiently serious breach test with that concerning res judicata. There are two issues that should be highlighted by way of conclusion, which are related albeit distinct. in this respect, and the hurdle may be especially dif ficult to surmount in relation to the types of case that arise in the context of risk regulation. It may be felt that the EU courts were harsh on the claimant insofar they held that even though Article 11 of Directive 65/65 did not entail meaningful discretion the legal and factual complexity surrounding its application meant that the applicant had not proven the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law for the purposes of damages liability. The temptation to reach this conclusion should nonetheless be resisted for the following reason.
It is clear that Article 11 was mandatory, since it provides that the competent authorities of the Member States shall suspend or revoke a marketing authorization where the product proves to be harmful in the normal conditions of use, or where its therapeutic efficacy is lacking, or where its qualitative and quantitative composition is not as declared. Article 11 further stipulates that therapeutic efficacy is lacking when it is established that therapeutic results cannot be obtained with the medicinal product. There is thus no meaningful discretion whether to suspend or revoke the marketing authorization. This must be done when the conditions mentioned in Article 11 exist.
The reasoning of the GC and the CJEU relating to Article 11 was different, but it was informed by a common rationale, this being that although Article 11 was mandatory in the preceding sense, there could well be differences of opinion as how to test for harm or for therapeutic efficacy. This is a common problem. It is frequently the case that a regulation may impose a mandatory obligation to achieve a particular objective, but for there to be real interpretive choices as to how those objectives should best be attained. In such instances there is discretion not as to whether to pursue a particular objective, but as to how the objective should best be measured or realized.
This was acknowledged by the GC and the CJEU, although they reacted to it in different ways. The GC,
Sufficiently serious breach
The first relates to application of the sufficiently serious breach test. It has never been easy to prove the conditions for damages liability against the EU, although the test has become somewhat less restrictive than it was in the earlier years." The need to prove the existence of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law has always been the principal stumbling block Case C-221/10 P, para. 104. Case C-221/10 P, para. 108. Case C-221/10 P, para. 
Appeals, errors and alternative legal grounds
The CJEU decided that the GC had committed errors of law, but that its substantive conclusion would not be overturned because it could be sustained on the grounds set out in the preceding analysis. This approach has a long pedigree in the CJEU's case law, and it is premised on sound normative ar guments. The underlying assumption is that it would be wasteful of time and resources if the case were to be remitted back to the GC following annulment of its decision, if the CJEU felt that the decision could be upheld on different grounds. This strategy is moreover especially attractive where the CJEU has a view as to the proper interpretation of the contested provision, since it is able to set down that interpretation in a binding judgment, which will then be relevant for later cases. This is fine, provided that the applicant has the opportunity to contest the alternative legal ground advanced by the CJEU. The applicant's arguments before the CJEU will of course be directed towards revealing the errors that it believes to be present in the GC's judgment. It may become aware during the course of argument of some alternative legal argument that finds favour with the CJEU, but it may not. The alternative ground preferred by the CJEU may well make sense, and indeed this was so in Artegodan itself. This does not alter the point of principle being made here, which is that other things being equal basic precepts of due process require that par ties have an opportunity to respond to arguments that will be dispositive of the case. In Fra.bo, it was held by the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") that 'Article 28 EC' must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to standardisation and certification activities of a private-law body, where the national legislation considers the products certified by that body to be compliant with national law and that has the effect of restricting the marketing of products which are not certified by that body'" (author's headnote).
Facts
Fra.bo SpA ("Fra.bo") is an Italian business which manufactures and sells copper fittings. These copper fittings are used to connect two pieces of piping for water or gas. They have sealing rings made of malleable material at the ends to make them water tight.
In Germany, the Deutsche Vereinigung des Gasund Wasserfaches eV ("DVGW") makes standards which lay down the technical requirements with which such copper fittings have to comply. It is an association established under private law. German legislation has provided that products in connection with the supply of water can be lawfully brought on the German market if they have a CE mark. If they do not have a CE mark, the alternative is for products to be certified by DVGW. In fact, DVGW uses a sub-contractor for its certification activities, for which its own technical standards are used.
Fra.bo applied for certification of its copper fit- ed a certificate for the duration of five years. The cer tification assessment itself had been subcontracted by the German laboratory which was normally used and approved by DVGW to a non-approved Italian laboratory. During the five-year period in which the certificate was valid DVGW received complaints by third parties which resulted in a re-assessment procedure, directly undertaken by the approved German laboratory. In 2005, DVGW informed Fra.bo that its fittings had not passed the ozone test, but that it was free to submit its own assessment report within three months. Fra.bo then had another assessment done by a non-approved Italian laboratory, which found that its fittings did pass the ozone test. However, DVGW refused to recognise this report because it had not been undertaken by one of its approved laboratories. As a consequence, it cancelled Fra.bo's certificate in June 2005. Therefore, Fra.bo was no longer able to place its copper fittings on the German mar ket.
After the cancellation of the certificate, Fra.bo brought an action against the cancellation before the Landgericht K6ln, which dismissed its claim. It then appealed to the Oberlandesgericht Disseldorf, which decided to stay the proceedings to make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU"). Its main question was whether Ar ticle 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 EC), which provides for the right to free movement of goods, was applicable to the standardisation and certification activities of DVGW If the answer to this question was negative, its alternative question was whether DVGW's standardisation and certification activities constituted "economic activity" for the purposes of Article ioi TFEU (ex Article 81 EC).
Judgment
It is appropriate to start with the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Trstenjak. She argued that it was already clear from the CJEU's case law on the applicability of the free movement provisions to private parties that it had moved to an approach based on the effects of the rules created by collective regulators. Although the previous cases had not expressly dealt with the free movement of goods, and it had been argued that horizontal direct effect of the free movement of goods had been excluded by the CJEU, as a matter of principle it would not be right to take a different approach to free movement of goods visa-vis the other fundamental freedoms. Given that DVGW had obtained a position of significant power in the certification market as a result of the German legislation, it was virtually impossible to bring the fittings on the market without a certificate awarded by DVGW. This effect was reinforced by the fact that the referring Court had found that the copper fittings were not covered by a harmonised European technical standard, which meant that this was not a case in which Fra.bo could obtain a CE mark. Certification by DVGW was then the only alternative. AG Trstenjak argued that given this defacto competence to decide which products could be lawfully brought on the market, which had been granted to DVGW by the German legislation, its activities had to be caught by the provision on free movement of goods.
The CJEU more or less followed the arguments of AG Trstenjak. In a relatively short judgment it, first of all, found that the copper fittings in question were not covered by a harmonised European technical standard. As such, Member States were free to adopt their own technical standards, which would still have to comply with the free movement of goods.
The CJEU then focussed exclusively on the applicability of Article 34 TFEU. Although DVGW was a private law association over which the German State did not exercise any decisive influence, this in itself did not constitute a reason not to apply the free movement provisions to its activities. Therefore, the question for the CJEU to answer was whether the activities of DVGW could have "the effect of giving rise to restrictions on the free movement of goods in the same manner as do measures imposed by the State". ' The CJEU answered this question in the affirmative and, in reaching its conclusion, used three key arguments.
7 First of all, German legislation had provided that goods certified by DVGW would be compliant with national law and could be lawfully brought on the market. Secondly, DVGW was the only body which certified copper fittings in Germany. As a result, the only possibility for business to obtain a certificate of compliance was through certification by DVGW Thirdly, a lack of certification by DVGW would result in serious difficulties to place products on the German market. Almost all German consumers bought copper fittings which had been certified by DVGW On the basis of these three arguments, the CJEU held that "a body such as the DVGW, by virtue of its authority to certify the products, in reality holds the power to regulate the entry into the German market of products such as the copper fittings at issue in the main proceedings" and that, consequently, Article 34 TFEU was applicable to its standardisation and certification activities. This meant that it was not necessary to answer the question on the applicability of Article io TFEU.
Ill. Comment
It should not come as a surprise that the CJEU held that DVGW's activities were caught by the provision on the free movement of goods. In the past decade, the CJEU has gradually moved from deciding the applicability of the free movement provisions on the basis of the public or private status of the regulator to the actual impact of the regulatory actions on the internal market. This approach has been taken to improve the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law.' Public and private regulators act in the same internal market and while some of the Member States still have public regulators, others have delegated powers to private regulators. If Member States could escape the application of EU law by delegating regulatory powers to private parties, this would be highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the free movement provisions.
This rationale was clearlyrecognisedby AG Trstenjak and can also be seen in the judgment itself. The move towards an effects-based application of the free movement provisions is very clear from the structure of the judgment. The CJEU justified the application of the provision on the free movement of goods to DVGW by reference to three main arguments outlined above. These arguments were provided after the CJEU referred to the definition of a restriction of the right to free movement of goods based on the Dassonville formula." Traditionally, the determination of the applicability of the free movement provisions preceded the determination of a restriction. In this case, the issue of applicability is determined on the basis of the identification of a restriction. To put it in simple terms, Article 34 TFEU was held applicable to DVGW because its actions constituted a restriction of the free moment of goods. Therefore, it is clear that the free movement of goods provision was applied to DVGW's activities because of the impact its activities had on the internal market, not because of its public or private status as regulator. It is not entirely clear how this effects-based application can be reconciled with the CJEU's own statement in Fra.bo that the measures must give rise to restrictions to the free movement of goods imposed "in the same manner as do measures imposed by the State". 1 This would appear to be a somewhat formalistic return to If it is not really surprising that the free movement provisions were held applicable to DVGW's activities, why is Fra.bo still such an interesting case? This is because many EU lawyers were interested to find out whether the application of the free movement provisions to DVGW was considered to be horizontal or vertical direct effect by the CJEU. However, the CJEU was very careful not to touch on that issue in its judgment. One could argue that it no longer makes sense to distinguish between horizontal and vertical direct effect, since all what matters is the impact of the regulatory conduct on the internal market. This was the position taken by AG Maduro in his Opinion in Viking." While it is correct that it does not make any difference when deciding on the applicability of the free movement provisions, the horizontal or ver tical nature of the proceedings might still have an impact of the issue of responsibility or liability. If the Oberlandesgericht Disseldorf were to find that the activities of DVGW constituted an obstacle to Fra.bo's right to free movement, would DVGW be required to compensate Fra.bo itself, or would it be able to for ward the bill directly to the German State? After all, the effect of the German legislation was a decisive factor in the CJEU's decision to apply the free movement provisions to DVGW In that respect, the Fra.bo case is illustrative of a recent series of cases in which the private regulator to which the free movement provisions were applied had a clear link to the State and to national legislation. Although the German State had no direct influence on the activities of DVGW, DVGW's activities would not have had an important regulatory impact if the German legislation had not singled out DVGW as the main certification body in the market. As such, this case in a way challenges the CJEU's previous rationale for extending the application of the free movement provisions to private parties. In the traditional series of cases based on Walrave en Koch," the CJEU focussed on two functional criteria. The first was that the private party had to be engaged in collective regulation; the second was that it was exercising legal autonomy. In Fra.bo, there appears to be a tension between these two criteria. They did not cause any difficulties in cases like Walrave en Koch or Bosman, 1 4 in which the private regulators in question, the UCI and the UEFA, were clearly powerful private regulators which were entirely independent from the State. There was no link to national legislation. In Fra.bo, the collective regulation element of DVGW's activities derived from the German legislation. The collective impact of DVGW's certification activities would not have occurred but for the decision of the German legislature to refer to DVGW in the legislation. Therefore, it can be concluded that the collective regulation aspect of DVGW's activities was much more vertical than horizontal.
However, when we look at the criterion of legal autonomy the situation is quite different. DVGW was acting autonomously in its adoption of the rules which gave rise to the dispute in Fra.bo. The specif ic rules on the ozone testing had been adopted by DVGW itself without any State input. The same applied to its rules which provided that it would not accept reports from non-approved laboratories. In fact, the German legislation had given something of a "carte blanche" to DVGW to regulate according to its own standards and rules. It did not in any way prescribe how DVGW should exercise its standardisation and certification activities. Although the German legislation had placed DVGW in a position of regulatory power, the exercise of that regulatory power was not controlled by the legislation. From that perspective then, the application of the free movement provision would seem to be more horizontal than vertical.
This discussion is not purely theoretical, since it will have a real impact on the question of liability. If private regulators are increasingly going to be held liable under free movement law, the impact of the relationship between private regulators and the State on the issue of liability should be further clarified by the CJEU. This is not something which can simply be left to national courts, as it is a matter of EU law when the free movement provisions should be applied to private parties and when they should be held liable. Further clarification of some of the concepts used by the CJEU is required. For example, in Fra.bo, if legal autonomy was to be the key criterion, it would be just to hold DVGW individually and solely liable for any breaches of free movement law. However, if the application of the free movement provisions was more based on the collective regulation aspect, then it would be just to hold the German State liable. This is a question of legal certainty for national private regulators which remains to be answered by the CJEU. It was not adequately dealt with in Laval," in which the CJEU failed to apply its discussion of the interaction between the trade union's actions and the Swedish legislation to the question of liability. As a consequence, the Swedish Labour Court was left to decide the issue of liability with very limited guidance.6 The outcome cannot be described as a success." Therefore, the CJEU should not simply continue to extend the application of the free movement provisions to private parties without providing more guidance on this issue. While BRCAi affects only women and also carries an increased risk of ovarian cancer, BRCA2 raises the risk of breast cancer alone, and can affect both women and men.' Litigation started on May 12, 2009 when an as sortment of medical organizations' and a group of patients, researchers and genetic counselors working on the prevention and cure of breast cancer sued Myriad Genetics, the directors of the University of Utah Research Foundation, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The plaintiffs challenged fifteen claims of seven patents owned or exclusively licensed to Myriad Genetics, a company involved in diagnostic testing, and asked for summaOpponents argued that both inventions lacked novelty, inventive step and industrial application and posed ethical and policy concerns. One of the patents was revoked and the other was amended. After Myriad's appeal and opposition they were restored, but in an amended form". ry judgment on their invalidity. These claims fall into two main categories: product claims' and method claims.' The public debate raised by these patents focuses on whether the claims are patentable subject matter according to Title 35 % 101 U.S.C.,' since they include the so-called "wild type" sequences, namely DNA sequences not altered and mutated.' These sequences are the basis for performing any kind of clinical genetic predisposition test for breast and ovarian cancer, in order to establish the actual existence of mutations in the BRCAi and 2 genes of individuals.
The "Myriad
The claims have been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. According to the plaintiffs the claims fall within the judicial patentability exclusion affirmed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 0 on the laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. Fur thermore, they infringe the First Amend ment,'' which deals with liberty of expression and association, and Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Myriad was accused of having pursued, since the '90s, a commercial strategy aimed at gaining a monopoly on BRCAi and 2 mutations testing:
1. Myriad patented several BRCAi and 2 sequences, as well as the methods to compare them.
Then it enforced its patents and exclusive licens-
es against other researchers, clinicians and laboratories offering similar services, by sending cease 5 The "product category" includes: (a) Claims that cover the isolated BRCA genes (claim 1 of the '282 patent, claim 1 of the '473 patent, and claims 1 and 6 of the '492 patent); (b) Claims that cover only the BRCA cDNA (claims 2 and 7 of the '282 patent and claim 7 of the '492 patent); (c) Claims that cover portions of the BRCA genes and cDNA as small as 15 nucleotides long (claims 5 and 6 of the '282 patent). 6 The "method category" encompasses method claims directed at comparing or analyzing a patient's altered BRCA sequence with the normal one or wild-type one to identify the presence of cancer-predisposing mutations (e. The central issue discussed by the panel members was whether the act of isolating a DNA sequence, separating a sequence of nucleotides from the rest of the chromosome, is an inventive act that entitles the per son who first did it to a patent or not. Each member of the panel had a different point of view on the question. While Judges Lourie and Moore agreed that Myriad's DNA sequences were patent-eligible, but disagreed on the rationale, Judge Bryson dissented in part and argued that isolated DNA is not patenteligible.
The product of nature doctrine applied to isolated DNA sequences
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court granted again petition for a writ of certiorari on the Myriad case, but limited it to one question presented by petitioners -"Are human genes patentable?" -2 and dismissed the other two, which concerned Myriad's method claims and petitioners' standing.
' The
Court's judgment of June 13, 2013 has, therefore, dealt only with patent eligibility of DNA sequences and focused on whether they are patentable subject matter, according to Title 35 % i0i U.S.C., or fall within one of the implicit exceptions to this provision established for laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. The rationale of these exceptions to patentability is that they represent "the basic tools of scientific and technological work" 22 that lie beyond the domain of patent protection. The first two excep- tions/exclusions to patentable subject matter, which regard the laws of nature and natural phenomena, result from the so-called product of nature doctrine, which can be traced back to the XIX century and was re-affirmed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty." According to it, the laws of nature and natural phenomena are excluded from patent protection, whereas a non-natural occurring manufacture or composition of matter -a product of human ingenuity -is patent-eligible. In order to assess whether this doctrine could be applied to Myriad's composition claims on DNAs sequences, the Court examined what Myriad's invention consisted of and concluded that "Myriad's principal contribution was uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCAi and BRCA2 genes within chromosomes 17 and 13"1.24 Confronting Myriad's gene claims with Chakrabarty's invention, it observed that Chakrabarty's bacterium was new, "with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature", whereas "Myriad did not create anything ... it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic materials is not an act of invention".Justice Thomas, who delivered the opinion of the Court, ar gued that although isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds, Myriad's claims were not expressed in terms of chemical composition nor did they rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from isolation of a particular section of DNA. The Judge pointed out that the claims, instead, focused on the genetic information encoded in the BRCAi and 2 genes 2 ' because it is the genetic information that is valuable for Myriad. As a matter of fact, "if the patents depended upon the creation of a unique molecule, then a would be infringer could ar guably avoid at least Myriad's patent claims on entire genes ... by isolating a DNA sequence that included both the BRCAi or BRCA2 gene and one additional nucleotide pair". Since such a molecule would not be chemically identical to the molecule invented by Myriad, there would not be any patent infringement. However, as the Court argued, Myriad would resist that outcome, since its claims are concerned primar ily with the information in the genetic sequence, not with the specific chemical composition of a particular molecule. The Court, therefore, concluded unanimously that "genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under % o1 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material".This holding may have significant consequences on the USPTO long-standing practice of granting patents on isolated DNA sequences because, for the first time, the Supreme Court made clear that extensive research effort and the mere isolation of DNA sequences are insufficient to satisfy the demands of
%101.
The Court, however, deemed cDNA patent eligible under % 1o1 since it is not naturally occurring. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained 2 DNA molecules can be also synthesized in the laboratory and one type of synthetic DNA molecule is complementary DNA or cDNA. cDNA is synthesized from mRNA using complementary base pairing in a manner analogous to RNA transcription. Because it is synthesizedfrom mRNA, cDNA contains only the exon sequences (the coding regions for proteins) and none of the intron sequences (the non-coding regions) from a chromosomal gene sequence. The creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that does not exist in nature. Therefore, cDNA sequences were considered patenteligible.
Ill. Comment
As regards DNA sequences, isolation and purification are scientific concepts that have acquired legal relevance in patent systems to distinguish nonpatentable sequences from patentable ones. 29 In the United States the introduction 0 into the USPTO's revised Utility Examination Guidelines" of 20012 of the criteria of isolation and purification has established the rationale to legally demarcate between naturally occurring DNA sequences and artificially isolated/purified ones. According to the Guidelines, "an isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as an article of manufacture because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is different from the naturally occurring compound". The inclusion of these criteria in the USPTO's Utility Examination Guidelines has supported DNA sequences patentability, reducing the risks for DNA patent holders to incur the "product of nature" doctrine's objections." Although the meanings of "isolation" and "purification" seem to be clear, the Myriad case has instead shown all the ambiguities related to their practical implementation. Genes, as Judge Sweet pointed out, are of a double-nature: on one hand, they are chemical substances or molecules and, on the other, they are carriers of information. In the Myriad case the molecule"" makes it "markedly different" from native DNA. Furthermore, he embraced a structural description of DNA sequences, pointing out that although "biologists may think of molecules in terms of their uses, genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents by their structures rather than by their functions"." Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the view that genes carry information and it is their information that makes them valuable for patent pur poses. Like the U.S. Department of Justice, which wrote a brief for the United States as amicus curiae in support of neither party, the Court considered the structural difference between isolated DNA and native DNA (namely the isolated segment's "snipped" ends) with no functional consequences, as the truncation does not alter the operative properties of the isolated DNA segment.
4 0 This perspective is focused on the function that DNA performs in the human body and in a laboratory. If the function performed is the same and the "additional utility" that isolation adds is simply the ability of researchers to study and exploit in a laboratory the inherent natural proper ties that isolated DNA shares with native DNA, isolated DNA sequences will not be patent eligible, according to the brief.
1
The word "isolation" generally refers to "separating a specific gene or sequence of nucleotides from the rest of the chromosome".
4 2 However, in order to establish patent eligibility of a specific isolated DNA sequence, the patent examiner must ascertain whether isolation makes the sequence "markedly dif ferent" from the one found in nature or not. The US P-TO issued patents on isolated DNA sequences for more than twenty years. This practice, as the United Although, according to Myriad, the USPTO's past practice of awarding gene patents should be entitled to deference by the courts, the Supreme Court disagreed, recalling the Department of Justice's brief. The brief made clear that the USPTO's revised Utility Examination Guidelines do not have the force of the law and do not specifically address patents on DNA, but were revised to fix a standard for determining utility generally.
4 4 Moreover, Congress has never specifically considered the USPTO's practice of granting patents on isolated DNA in its bills related to patents on genetic materials. 45 The correctness of the USPTO's practice was never challenged in litigation prior to the Myriad case, but the Supreme Court designed an opposite frame to describe the "nature" of genes, centred on their biological information and function. Within this frame, in order to assess gene patent eligibility, the concept of isolation entails more than extensive research and economical investments to achieve the separation of a DNA sequence from the rest of the chromosome. 46 This choice in favor of defining genes by their informational character and function may, therefore, affect the application of the criteria of isolation in the future and bring about a substantial change in the USPTO's practice of granting patents on native DNA sequences. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court was guided by the consideration that "patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating 'incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery' and 'imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention"'.
4 7 As the Department of Justice noted, "an overbroad conception of patent eligibility under %io can impose significant social costs by requiring the public to pay to study and exploit that which ought to be 'free to all men and reserved to none"'. 8 The product of nature doctrine exceptions to io reflect the public interest in avoiding undue restrictions imposed by patents that could preempt natural laws and substances. Unlike the USPTO's long-standing practice, the Supreme Court struck a different balance of the opposite interests involved in patenting DNA sequences: access to genetic information by scientific researchers and clinicians, patients' health care rights and intellectual property rights held by biotech companies.
IV. In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
On June 14, 2013, the day after the Supreme Court's decision was issued, Myriad's stock fell by 5.6%, and it became clear to analysts that, even though the company was partially successful before the Court, its market share in the genetic testing on BRCAi and 2 genes was expected to decrease. cising "march-in" rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to ensure greater access to genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer." As several patents held by Myriad are based in part on federally funded research, they are subject to the Bayh-Dole Act's provisions. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, federal agencies, such as the NIH, can exercise march-in rights ex post to compel licensing of patents on inventions made through federally funded research. The federal agency can take this initiative only in some circumstances, such as when the "action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees"." Senator Leahy highlighted the importance of Myriad's genetic test for public health and the fact that the company is its only provider, because it is covered by patent protection, and charges between $3,000 and $4,000. Since, by exercising march-in rights, the NIH can require the patent holder to grant a license on reasonable terms (that can be non-exclusive, partially exclusive or exclusive), Senator Leahy claims that this initiative would meet the health needs of the public who cannot afford the testing provided by Myriad.
As early as 2003 Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg," discussing the Bayh-Dole's reform and the progress of biomedicine, pointed out that biomedical tradition of open science has been eroded consider ably over the past decades, since "proprietary claims have reached farther upstream from end products to cover fundamental discoveries that provide the knowledge base for future product development",6 and that this change is partially due to the narrowing of the conceptual gap between fundamental research and commercial application. According to them, the changes in the economic structure of research and in the case law, that adopted an expansive approach to patent eligibility while relaxing the standards for patent protection, such as utility and nonobviousness, may sometimes, in the long run, hinder rather than accelerate biomedical research. As a response to the problems arising from the frenzy of patent claims on upstream research tools, they envisaged a set of solutions, which included the reinvigoration of the product of nature limitation on patent eligibility, so that discoveries of DNA sequences and proteins could be excluded from patent protection, and to fortify the utility standard to limit the patenting of broadly enabling research tools. In addition, they argued that march-in rights could be used by agencies to better assure the public inter est in federally funded patented inventions, but the administrative hurdles are so cumbersome that the NIH has never exercised these rights.
In the Myriad case, the Supreme Court has already intervened decisively, reinvigorating the product of nature doctrine and reshaping the criterion of isolation. However, since citizens'health interests at stake are so relevant, maybe for the first time the NIH would actually exercise march-in rights in order to serve and fulfill the public interest involved in federally funded inventions.
